Ayse Zarakol
2021
Zarakol, Ayse; Adler-Nissen, Rebecca
Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents Journal Article
In: International Organization, pp. 611 - 634, 2021.
@article{Zarakol2021,
title = {Struggles for Recognition: The Liberal International Order and the Merger of Its Discontents},
author = {Ayse Zarakol and Rebecca Adler-Nissen},
doi = {10.1017/S0020818320000454},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-07-02},
urldate = {2021-07-02},
journal = {International Organization},
pages = {611 - 634},
abstract = {The Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently being undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment towards the LIO's status hierarchy, rather than just economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semi-periphery, fuelled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically and organisationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.},
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The Liberal International Order (LIO) is currently being undermined not only by states such as Russia but also by voters in the West. We argue that both veins of discontent are driven by resentment towards the LIO's status hierarchy, rather than just economic grievances. Approaching discontent historically and sociologically, we show that there are two strains of recognition struggles against the LIO: one in the core of the West, driven by populist politicians and their voters, and one on the semi-periphery, fuelled by competitively authoritarian governments and their supporters. At this particular moment in history, these struggles are digitally, ideologically and organisationally interconnected in their criticism of LIO institutions, amplifying each other. The LIO is thus being hollowed out from within at a time when it is also facing some of its greatest external challenges.
2019
Zarakol, Ayse; Phillips, Andrew; Reus-Smit, Christian; Zarakol, Ayse; Millward, James A.; Hui, Victoria; Hurrell, Andrew; Ikenberry, G. John; Berrey, Ellen; Swidler, Ann; Lorca, Arnulf Becker; Barnett, Michael; Birnbaum, Maria; Towns, Ann; Kalaycioglu, Elif
Culture and Order in World Politics Book
Cambridge University Press, 2019, ISBN: 9781108754613.
@book{Zarakol2019,
title = {Culture and Order in World Politics},
author = {Ayse Zarakol and Andrew Phillips and Christian Reus-Smit and Ayse Zarakol and James A. Millward and Victoria Hui and Andrew Hurrell and G. John Ikenberry and Ellen Berrey and Ann Swidler and Arnulf Becker Lorca and Michael Barnett and Maria Birnbaum and Ann Towns and Elif Kalaycioglu},
editor = { Andrew Phillips and Christian Reus-Smit},
doi = {10.1017/9781108754613},
isbn = {9781108754613},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-12-01},
urldate = {2019-12-01},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
abstract = {Understanding how cultural diversity relates to international order is an urgent contemporary challenge. Building on ideas first advanced in Reus-Smit's On Cultural Diversity (2018), this groundbreaking book advances a new framework for understanding the nexus between culture and order in world politics. Through a pioneering interdisciplinary collaboration between leading historians, international lawyers, sociologists and international relations scholars, it argues that cultural diversity in social life is ubiquitous rather than exceptional, and demonstrates that the organization of cultural diversity has been inextricably tied to the constitution and legitimation of political authority in diverse international orders, from Warring States China, through early modern Europe and the Ottoman and Qing Empires, to today's global liberal order. It highlights the successive 'diversity regimes' that have been constructed to govern cultural difference since the nineteenth century, traces the exclusions and resistances these projects have engendered and considers contemporary global vulnerabilities and axes of contestation.},
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Understanding how cultural diversity relates to international order is an urgent contemporary challenge. Building on ideas first advanced in Reus-Smit's On Cultural Diversity (2018), this groundbreaking book advances a new framework for understanding the nexus between culture and order in world politics. Through a pioneering interdisciplinary collaboration between leading historians, international lawyers, sociologists and international relations scholars, it argues that cultural diversity in social life is ubiquitous rather than exceptional, and demonstrates that the organization of cultural diversity has been inextricably tied to the constitution and legitimation of political authority in diverse international orders, from Warring States China, through early modern Europe and the Ottoman and Qing Empires, to today's global liberal order. It highlights the successive 'diversity regimes' that have been constructed to govern cultural difference since the nineteenth century, traces the exclusions and resistances these projects have engendered and considers contemporary global vulnerabilities and axes of contestation.
Zarakol, Ayse; Çapan, Zeynep Gülsah
Turkey’s ambivalent self: ontological insecurity in ‘Kemalism’ versus ‘Erdoğanism’ Journal Article
In: Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32 (4), pp. 1-20, 2019.
@article{Zarakol2019b,
title = {Turkey’s ambivalent self: ontological insecurity in ‘Kemalism’ versus ‘Erdoğanism’},
author = {Ayse Zarakol and Zeynep Gülsah Çapan},
doi = {10.1080/09557571.2019.1589419},
year = {2019},
date = {2019-04-13},
urldate = {2019-04-13},
journal = {Cambridge Review of International Affairs},
volume = {32},
number = {4},
pages = {1-20},
abstract = {This article aims to understand the ‘non-Western self’ and the different ways its ontological insecurity can manifest, through the example of Turkey, by contrasting Kemalism’s modernizing vision with Erdoğan’s current populism. We argue that the constructions of political narratives in Turkey (and by implication in other similar settings) derive from two interrelated aspects of the spatio-temporal hierarchies of (colonial) modernity: structural insecurity and temporal insecurity. Modern Turkey’s ontological insecurity was constructed spatially, on the one hand, as liminality and structural in-betweenness, and temporally, on the other, as lagging behind the modernization of the West. After discussing how Kemalism offered to deal with such insecurities in the twentieth century, we analyse the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period of the twenty-first century as an alternative attempted answer to these problems and explain why efforts to dismantle the Kemalist framework collapsed into its populist mirror image. The example of the Turkish case underlines the importance of focusing on the different ways in which the structural and temporal insecurities of ‘the non-Western self’ take shape at a given point and manner of entry into the modern international order.
},
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This article aims to understand the ‘non-Western self’ and the different ways its ontological insecurity can manifest, through the example of Turkey, by contrasting Kemalism’s modernizing vision with Erdoğan’s current populism. We argue that the constructions of political narratives in Turkey (and by implication in other similar settings) derive from two interrelated aspects of the spatio-temporal hierarchies of (colonial) modernity: structural insecurity and temporal insecurity. Modern Turkey’s ontological insecurity was constructed spatially, on the one hand, as liminality and structural in-betweenness, and temporally, on the other, as lagging behind the modernization of the West. After discussing how Kemalism offered to deal with such insecurities in the twentieth century, we analyse the Justice and Development Party (AKP) period of the twenty-first century as an alternative attempted answer to these problems and explain why efforts to dismantle the Kemalist framework collapsed into its populist mirror image. The example of the Turkish case underlines the importance of focusing on the different ways in which the structural and temporal insecurities of ‘the non-Western self’ take shape at a given point and manner of entry into the modern international order.
2018
Zarakol, Ayse
Sovereign equality as misrecognition Journal Article
In: Review of International Studies, 44 (5), pp. 848-862, 2018.
@article{Zarakol2018,
title = {Sovereign equality as misrecognition},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.1017/S0260210518000359},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-12-01},
urldate = {2018-12-01},
journal = {Review of International Studies},
volume = {44},
number = {5},
pages = {848-862},
abstract = {This article makes two contributions. First, I argue that contrary to what was often assumed in the recognition literature, social hierarchies (as in the Hegelian master–slave dynamic) are very stable. Though social hierarchies are relationships of misrecognition, they nevertheless allow for the simulation of recognition for ‘the master’, and also trap ‘the slave’ in that role through stigmatisation. Second, I make a historical argument about the state and its role in recognition struggles. The modern state is relatively unique (historically speaking) in being tasked with solving the recognition problems of its citizens. At the same time, the modern state has to derive its own sovereignty from the recognition of those same citizens. There is an inherent tension between these two facts, which forces the modern state to turn increasingly outward for its own recognition. This is why ‘the master–slave dynamic’ was increasingly projected onto the international stage from nineteenth century onwards (along with the diffusion of the modern state model). As a result, international recognition came to play an even larger role in state sovereignty than domestic recognition (in contrast to common historical practice). This also explains how and why social hierarchies came to dominate international politics around the same time as the norm of sovereign equality.},
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This article makes two contributions. First, I argue that contrary to what was often assumed in the recognition literature, social hierarchies (as in the Hegelian master–slave dynamic) are very stable. Though social hierarchies are relationships of misrecognition, they nevertheless allow for the simulation of recognition for ‘the master’, and also trap ‘the slave’ in that role through stigmatisation. Second, I make a historical argument about the state and its role in recognition struggles. The modern state is relatively unique (historically speaking) in being tasked with solving the recognition problems of its citizens. At the same time, the modern state has to derive its own sovereignty from the recognition of those same citizens. There is an inherent tension between these two facts, which forces the modern state to turn increasingly outward for its own recognition. This is why ‘the master–slave dynamic’ was increasingly projected onto the international stage from nineteenth century onwards (along with the diffusion of the modern state model). As a result, international recognition came to play an even larger role in state sovereignty than domestic recognition (in contrast to common historical practice). This also explains how and why social hierarchies came to dominate international politics around the same time as the norm of sovereign equality.
Zarakol, Ayse; Lopez, Julia Costa; Carvalho, Benjamin De; Latham, Andrew A; Bartelson, Jens; Holm, Minda
Forum: In the Beginning There was No Word (for it): Terms, Concepts, and Early Sovereignty Bachelor Thesis
2018.
@bachelorthesis{Zarakol2018b,
title = {Forum: In the Beginning There was No Word (for it): Terms, Concepts, and Early Sovereignty},
author = {Ayse Zarakol and Julia Costa Lopez and Benjamin De Carvalho and Andrew A Latham and Jens Bartelson and Minda Holm},
doi = {10.1093/isr/viy053},
year = {2018},
date = {2018-07-26},
urldate = {2018-07-26},
journal = {International Studies Review},
volume = {20},
number = {2},
abstract = {It is difficult to overstate the importance of the concept sovereignty for international relations (IR). And yet, understanding the historical emergence of sovereignty in international relations has long been curtailed by the all-encompassing myth of the Peace of Westphalia. While criticism of this myth has opened space for further historical inquiry in recent years, it has also raised important questions of historical interpretation and methodology relevant to IR, as applying our current conceptual framework to distant historical cases is far from unproblematic. Central among these questions is the when, what, and how of sovereignty: from when can we use “sovereignty” to analyze international politics and for which polities? Can sovereignty be used when the actors themselves did not have recourse to the terminology? And what about polities that do not have recourse to the term at all? What are the theoretical implications of applying the concept of sovereignty to early polities? From different theoretical and methodological perspectives, the contributions in this forum shed light on these questions of sovereignty and how to treat the concept analytically when applied to a period or place when/where the term did not exist as such. In doing so, this forum makes the case for a sensitivity to the historical dimension of our arguments about sovereignty—and, by extension, international relations past and present—as this holds the key to the types of claims we can make about the polities of the world and their relations.},
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It is difficult to overstate the importance of the concept sovereignty for international relations (IR). And yet, understanding the historical emergence of sovereignty in international relations has long been curtailed by the all-encompassing myth of the Peace of Westphalia. While criticism of this myth has opened space for further historical inquiry in recent years, it has also raised important questions of historical interpretation and methodology relevant to IR, as applying our current conceptual framework to distant historical cases is far from unproblematic. Central among these questions is the when, what, and how of sovereignty: from when can we use “sovereignty” to analyze international politics and for which polities? Can sovereignty be used when the actors themselves did not have recourse to the terminology? And what about polities that do not have recourse to the term at all? What are the theoretical implications of applying the concept of sovereignty to early polities? From different theoretical and methodological perspectives, the contributions in this forum shed light on these questions of sovereignty and how to treat the concept analytically when applied to a period or place when/where the term did not exist as such. In doing so, this forum makes the case for a sensitivity to the historical dimension of our arguments about sovereignty—and, by extension, international relations past and present—as this holds the key to the types of claims we can make about the polities of the world and their relations.
2017
Zarakol, Ayse
TRIPping Constructivism Journal Article
In: Political Science and Politics, 50 (1), pp. 75-78, 2017.
@article{Zarakol2017,
title = {TRIPping Constructivism},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.1017/S1049096516002183},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-01},
urldate = {2017-01-01},
journal = {Political Science and Politics},
volume = {50},
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abstract = {PS: Political Science & Politics provides critical analyses of contemporary political phenomena and is the journal of record for the discipline of political science reporting on research, teaching, and professional development. PS, begun in 1968, is the only quarterly professional news and commentary journal in the field and is the prime source of information on political scientists' achievements and professional concerns. PS: Political Science & Politics is sold ONLY as part of a joint subscription with American Political Science Review and Perspectives on Politics.},
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PS: Political Science & Politics provides critical analyses of contemporary political phenomena and is the journal of record for the discipline of political science reporting on research, teaching, and professional development. PS, begun in 1968, is the only quarterly professional news and commentary journal in the field and is the prime source of information on political scientists' achievements and professional concerns. PS: Political Science & Politics is sold ONLY as part of a joint subscription with American Political Science Review and Perspectives on Politics.
2015
Zarakol, Ayse
States and Ontological Security: A Historical Rethinking Journal Article
In: Cooperation and Conflict, 52 (1), 2015.
@article{Zarakol2015,
title = {States and Ontological Security: A Historical Rethinking},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.1177/0010836716653158},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-12-17},
urldate = {2015-12-17},
journal = {Cooperation and Conflict},
volume = {52},
number = {1},
abstract = {In this brief essay, I explore the relationship between ‘states’ (or more broadly, institutions of political authority) and ontological security. Drawing from historical examples, I argue that it is a mistake to assume that all ‘states’ seek ontological security: this generalisation applies only to those polities that claim to be the main ontological security providers. I then develop a typology of institutional ontological security provision arrangements as have existed throughout history, arguing that another reason the concept of ontological security is valuable for international relations (IR) is because it offers a way to compare systems across time and space without assuming the primacy of politics or religion. In summary, IR does not have to limit its use of the concept of ontological security to a synonym for ‘state identity’ – ontological security can offer much more than that by helping the discipline reach across time and space.},
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In this brief essay, I explore the relationship between ‘states’ (or more broadly, institutions of political authority) and ontological security. Drawing from historical examples, I argue that it is a mistake to assume that all ‘states’ seek ontological security: this generalisation applies only to those polities that claim to be the main ontological security providers. I then develop a typology of institutional ontological security provision arrangements as have existed throughout history, arguing that another reason the concept of ontological security is valuable for international relations (IR) is because it offers a way to compare systems across time and space without assuming the primacy of politics or religion. In summary, IR does not have to limit its use of the concept of ontological security to a synonym for ‘state identity’ – ontological security can offer much more than that by helping the discipline reach across time and space.
Zarakol, Ayse; Mattern, Janice Bially
Hierarchies in World Politics Journal Article
In: International Organization, 1 (3), 2015.
@article{Zarakol2015b,
title = {Hierarchies in World Politics},
author = {Ayse Zarakol and Janice Bially Mattern},
doi = {10.1017/S0020818316000126},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-10-13},
urldate = {2015-10-13},
journal = {International Organization},
volume = {1},
number = {3},
abstract = {Hierarchy-centered approaches to IR promise to deliver what anarchy-centered approaches have not: a framework for theorizing and empirically analyzing world politics as a global system rather than just an international one. At the core of this proposition are three features of hierarchical systems as they are represented across the growing IR literature on the topic. First, the structures of differentiation at the core of hierarchical systems are deeply implicated with power. Hierarchical systems are thus intrinsically political. Second, in world politics, hierarchies stratify, rank, and organize the relations not only among states but also other kinds of actors as well, and often even a mix of different actors within a single structure of differentiation. Third, there are many different kinds of hierarchical relations in world politics, each of which generate different “logics” influencing social, moral, and behavioral outcomes. Hierarchy has been understood in the IR literature in two ways: narrowly, as a relationship of legitimate authority; and broadly, as intersubjective manifestations of organized inequality. Hierarchy operates in a variety of different ways that range from ordering solutions to deep structures. We identify three such “logics” that have been fruitfully explored in IR scholarship and that can form the basis of a future research agenda: hierarchy as an institutionalized functional bargain between actors (a logic of trade-offs); hierarchy as differentiated social and political roles shaping behavior (a logic of positionality); and hierarchy as a productive political space or structure (a logic of productivity).},
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Hierarchy-centered approaches to IR promise to deliver what anarchy-centered approaches have not: a framework for theorizing and empirically analyzing world politics as a global system rather than just an international one. At the core of this proposition are three features of hierarchical systems as they are represented across the growing IR literature on the topic. First, the structures of differentiation at the core of hierarchical systems are deeply implicated with power. Hierarchical systems are thus intrinsically political. Second, in world politics, hierarchies stratify, rank, and organize the relations not only among states but also other kinds of actors as well, and often even a mix of different actors within a single structure of differentiation. Third, there are many different kinds of hierarchical relations in world politics, each of which generate different “logics” influencing social, moral, and behavioral outcomes. Hierarchy has been understood in the IR literature in two ways: narrowly, as a relationship of legitimate authority; and broadly, as intersubjective manifestations of organized inequality. Hierarchy operates in a variety of different ways that range from ordering solutions to deep structures. We identify three such “logics” that have been fruitfully explored in IR scholarship and that can form the basis of a future research agenda: hierarchy as an institutionalized functional bargain between actors (a logic of trade-offs); hierarchy as differentiated social and political roles shaping behavior (a logic of positionality); and hierarchy as a productive political space or structure (a logic of productivity).
Zarakol, Ayse
The interplay between regional international societies: a response to Thomas Linsenmaier Bachelor Thesis
2015.
@bachelorthesis{Zarakol2015c,
title = {The interplay between regional international societies: a response to Thomas Linsenmaier},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.1080/23269995.2015.1053243},
year = {2015},
date = {2015-07-03},
urldate = {2015-07-03},
journal = {Global Discourse},
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2014
Zarakol, Ayse
What made the modern world hang together: Socialisation or stigmatisation? Journal Article
In: International Theory, 6 (2), pp. 311-332, 2014.
@article{Zarakol2014,
title = {What made the modern world hang together: Socialisation or stigmatisation?},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.1017/S1752971914000141},
year = {2014},
date = {2014-07-01},
urldate = {2014-07-01},
journal = {International Theory},
volume = {6},
number = {2},
pages = {311-332},
abstract = {Contrary to what is often assumed, norm-internalisation does not always lead to compliance. Normative judgements may be simultaneously internalised and outwardly rejected. Non-compliance is at times a result of hyper-awareness of the particular origin of norms, rather than an unwillingness of the would-be-recipients to do ‘good’ deeds, or their inability to understand what is ‘good’. Such is often the case for non-Western states, as I demonstrate in this article by utilising the sociological concepts of stigma and stigmatisation. In its inability to acknowledge this dynamic, which has its roots in the colonial past of the international order, the constructivist model of norm-diffusion commits two errors. On the one hand, it falls short as a causal explanation, conflating internalisation with socialisation, and socialisation with compliance. On the other hand, it reproduces existing hierarchies in the international system, treating only non-compliance as endogenously driven, but compliance as a result of external stimuli. As there is a great deal of correlation between non-compliance and political geography, such a depiction, coupled with the fact that most norms under scrutiny are ‘good’ norms, once again casts non-Western states as having agency only when they commit ‘bad’ deeds.},
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Contrary to what is often assumed, norm-internalisation does not always lead to compliance. Normative judgements may be simultaneously internalised and outwardly rejected. Non-compliance is at times a result of hyper-awareness of the particular origin of norms, rather than an unwillingness of the would-be-recipients to do ‘good’ deeds, or their inability to understand what is ‘good’. Such is often the case for non-Western states, as I demonstrate in this article by utilising the sociological concepts of stigma and stigmatisation. In its inability to acknowledge this dynamic, which has its roots in the colonial past of the international order, the constructivist model of norm-diffusion commits two errors. On the one hand, it falls short as a causal explanation, conflating internalisation with socialisation, and socialisation with compliance. On the other hand, it reproduces existing hierarchies in the international system, treating only non-compliance as endogenously driven, but compliance as a result of external stimuli. As there is a great deal of correlation between non-compliance and political geography, such a depiction, coupled with the fact that most norms under scrutiny are ‘good’ norms, once again casts non-Western states as having agency only when they commit ‘bad’ deeds.
2013
Zarakol, Ayse
Revisiting Second Image Reversed: Lessons from Turkey and Thailand Journal Article
In: International Studies Quarterly, 57 (1), pp. 150-162, 2013.
@article{Zarakol2013,
title = {Revisiting Second Image Reversed: Lessons from Turkey and Thailand},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.2307/41804854},
year = {2013},
date = {2013-03-01},
urldate = {2013-03-01},
journal = {International Studies Quarterly},
volume = {57},
number = {1},
pages = {150-162},
abstract = {This article draws attention to some surprising similarities between the recent political trajectories of Turkey and Thailand in order to argue that international norms strongly shape domestic cleavage formations. The timing and the manner of incorporation of particular states into the international system affects not only their political and economic development, but also the way various domestic groups see their mission, their identity, and their opposition. In both Turkey and Thailand, what development has brought is neither the opposition between traditional status groups and the market generated social forces, nor the tradition/religion-based opposition to modernization and democracy that is typically assumed to mark developing societies. What we find in both cases instead is a modernization-generated statist/bureaucratic social middle class that justifies its skepticism of democratization on the basis of norms upheld by the international society itself.},
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This article draws attention to some surprising similarities between the recent political trajectories of Turkey and Thailand in order to argue that international norms strongly shape domestic cleavage formations. The timing and the manner of incorporation of particular states into the international system affects not only their political and economic development, but also the way various domestic groups see their mission, their identity, and their opposition. In both Turkey and Thailand, what development has brought is neither the opposition between traditional status groups and the market generated social forces, nor the tradition/religion-based opposition to modernization and democracy that is typically assumed to mark developing societies. What we find in both cases instead is a modernization-generated statist/bureaucratic social middle class that justifies its skepticism of democratization on the basis of norms upheld by the international society itself.
2012
Zarakol, Ayse; McCargo, Duncan
Turkey and Thailand: Unlikely Twins Journal Article
In: Journal of Democracy, 23 (3), pp. 71-79, 2012.
@article{Zarakol2012,
title = {Turkey and Thailand: Unlikely Twins},
author = {Ayse Zarakol and Duncan McCargo},
doi = {10.1353/jod.2012.0055},
year = {2012},
date = {2012-07-01},
urldate = {2012-07-01},
journal = {Journal of Democracy},
volume = {23},
number = {3},
pages = {71-79},
abstract = {This article compares recent political developments in two seemingly different countries: Turkey and Thailand. The similarities between the trajectories of Turkey and Thailand date back to their similar manner of incorporation into the modern international system in the late nineteenth century. In recent years, the rise of new societal groups based upon urbanized villagers has produced charismatic populist leaders who preach democracy, but practise electoralism. Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan and Thaksin Shinawatra are locked in parallel confrontations with traditionally interventionist military/bureaucratic elites. A comparison between Thailand and Turkey provides insights that are generally applicable to our understanding of democratization outside the West.},
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This article compares recent political developments in two seemingly different countries: Turkey and Thailand. The similarities between the trajectories of Turkey and Thailand date back to their similar manner of incorporation into the modern international system in the late nineteenth century. In recent years, the rise of new societal groups based upon urbanized villagers has produced charismatic populist leaders who preach democracy, but practise electoralism. Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan and Thaksin Shinawatra are locked in parallel confrontations with traditionally interventionist military/bureaucratic elites. A comparison between Thailand and Turkey provides insights that are generally applicable to our understanding of democratization outside the West.
2011
Zarakol, Ayse
What makes terrorism modern? Terrorism, legitimacy, and the international system Journal Article
In: Review of International Studies, 37 (5), pp. 2311 - 2336, 2011.
@article{Zarakol2011,
title = {What makes terrorism modern? Terrorism, legitimacy, and the international system},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.1017/S0260210510001518},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-12-01},
urldate = {2011-12-01},
journal = {Review of International Studies},
volume = {37},
number = {5},
pages = {2311 - 2336},
abstract = {This article aims to understand the phenomenon of international terrorism by wedding a constructivist understanding of terrorism with an overview of the historical evolution of the state. The Westphalian state has replaced three types of authority: religious, personal and local. Political challenges to the modern international system inevitably derive their claim to legitimacy from one of these other forms of authority. I argue that there is a correlation between the kind of legitimacy claim a ‘terrorist’ cause is based on and how threatening we find the activities based on that claim. The less the distance between the unrecognised legitimacy claim on the one hand and the principles conferring legitimacy in the modern states system on the other, the less ontologically threatening we find the claimants to be. All historical variants of modern ‘terrorism’ fall into one of two categories of disruptive activity. They are either based in claims to local authority and target only particular states, or in claims to personal and/or religious authority and reject the modern states system altogether. Groups labelled as terrorist can therefore be classified as system-affirming or system-threatening. The former is a contained problem, but the latter has followed geographically broadening spread pattern throughout the international system.},
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This article aims to understand the phenomenon of international terrorism by wedding a constructivist understanding of terrorism with an overview of the historical evolution of the state. The Westphalian state has replaced three types of authority: religious, personal and local. Political challenges to the modern international system inevitably derive their claim to legitimacy from one of these other forms of authority. I argue that there is a correlation between the kind of legitimacy claim a ‘terrorist’ cause is based on and how threatening we find the activities based on that claim. The less the distance between the unrecognised legitimacy claim on the one hand and the principles conferring legitimacy in the modern states system on the other, the less ontologically threatening we find the claimants to be. All historical variants of modern ‘terrorism’ fall into one of two categories of disruptive activity. They are either based in claims to local authority and target only particular states, or in claims to personal and/or religious authority and reject the modern states system altogether. Groups labelled as terrorist can therefore be classified as system-affirming or system-threatening. The former is a contained problem, but the latter has followed geographically broadening spread pattern throughout the international system.
Zarakol, Ayse
Theorizing International Relations: Politics vs. Philosophy Journal Article
In: International Studies Review, 13 (4), pp. 647-653, 2011.
@article{Zarakol2011b,
title = {Theorizing International Relations: Politics vs. Philosophy},
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doi = {10.2307/41428864},
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date = {2011-12-01},
urldate = {2011-12-01},
journal = {International Studies Review},
volume = {13},
number = {4},
pages = {647-653},
abstract = {Despite the major differences among the theoretical orientations of the contributors, these three books have in common similar political goals both in respect to the discipline and to the world at large. Speaking from the relative margins of International Relations (IR), all three books aim to rethink meta-theoretical issues related to the discipline in order to (ultimately) bring consequences of domination in the international system into better focus. In that sense, all three books could be thought of as part of a growing critique of mainstream epistemologies of IR theory as enablers of status quo and privilege within world politics. Each of the contributors to these three volumes would agree that philosophical debates are also political.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
Despite the major differences among the theoretical orientations of the contributors, these three books have in common similar political goals both in respect to the discipline and to the world at large. Speaking from the relative margins of International Relations (IR), all three books aim to rethink meta-theoretical issues related to the discipline in order to (ultimately) bring consequences of domination in the international system into better focus. In that sense, all three books could be thought of as part of a growing critique of mainstream epistemologies of IR theory as enablers of status quo and privilege within world politics. Each of the contributors to these three volumes would agree that philosophical debates are also political.
Zarakol, Ayse; Subotic, Jelena
Cultural Intimacy in International Relations Journal Article
In: European Journal of International Relations, 19 (4), 2011.
@article{Zarakol2011c,
title = {Cultural Intimacy in International Relations},
author = {Ayse Zarakol and Jelena Subotic},
doi = {10.2139/ssrn.1916262},
year = {2011},
date = {2011-08-24},
urldate = {2011-08-24},
journal = {European Journal of International Relations},
volume = {19},
number = {4},
abstract = {In anthropology, the concept of cultural intimacy expresses those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of international criticism for the state, but are nevertheless used to provide insiders with a sense of national comfort, understanding, and self-reflexive, ontological security (Herzfeld, 2005). Cultural intimacy helps illuminate how states present themselves internationally and how they understand themselves domestically. It can also explain the seeming discrepancies and contradictions between a state’s domestic and international identities. Cultural intimacy, in other words, explains the mutual reproduction of different levels of identity. Using the concept of cultural intimacy as a departure point, this paper develops a framework for understanding incongruities in the domestic and international facades of state identity. We argue that there is a structural component to the level of discomfort caused by negative international appraisals of a given state. Structural position determines whether the domestic sources of cultural intimacy will cause shame, embarrassment or guilt, and therefore also indicate how that negative international image will be handled by the state. The theoretical argument is illustrated with reference to the cases of Serbia, Croatia, and the Netherlands, and their distinctive responses to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
In anthropology, the concept of cultural intimacy expresses those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of international criticism for the state, but are nevertheless used to provide insiders with a sense of national comfort, understanding, and self-reflexive, ontological security (Herzfeld, 2005). Cultural intimacy helps illuminate how states present themselves internationally and how they understand themselves domestically. It can also explain the seeming discrepancies and contradictions between a state’s domestic and international identities. Cultural intimacy, in other words, explains the mutual reproduction of different levels of identity. Using the concept of cultural intimacy as a departure point, this paper develops a framework for understanding incongruities in the domestic and international facades of state identity. We argue that there is a structural component to the level of discomfort caused by negative international appraisals of a given state. Structural position determines whether the domestic sources of cultural intimacy will cause shame, embarrassment or guilt, and therefore also indicate how that negative international image will be handled by the state. The theoretical argument is illustrated with reference to the cases of Serbia, Croatia, and the Netherlands, and their distinctive responses to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.
2010
Zarakol, Ayse
Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan Journal Article
In: International Relations, 24 (1), pp. 3-23 , 2010.
@article{Zarakol2010,
title = {Ontological (In)Security and State Denial of Historical Crimes: Turkey and Japan},
author = {Ayse Zarakol},
doi = {10.1177/0047117809359040},
year = {2010},
date = {2010-03-26},
urldate = {2010-03-26},
journal = {International Relations},
volume = {24},
number = {1},
pages = {3-23 },
abstract = {This article joins the growing scholarship on the ontological security needs of states. By focusing on state denial of historical crimes, the article will address the main point of contention among scholars who study ontological security, i.e. the question of whether identity pressures on states are mostly endogenously or exogenously generated. Through a study of the Turkish state’s reluctance to apologize for the Armenian genocide, and the Japanese discomfort over the WWII atrocities, I argue that we can avoid tautology in our generalizations by introducing temporal and spatial dimensions to the argument. Inter-subjective pressures matter more at times when traditional routines defining the self are broken and are more likely to create ontological insecurity outside the West. The review of the Turkish and Japanese cases demonstrate that both social and individualistic approaches to ontological security are partly right, but also incomplete because neither takes into account the uneven expansion of international society or the effect this expansion has had on the identity of outsider states who were incorporated into the system at a later date.},
keywords = {},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {article}
}
This article joins the growing scholarship on the ontological security needs of states. By focusing on state denial of historical crimes, the article will address the main point of contention among scholars who study ontological security, i.e. the question of whether identity pressures on states are mostly endogenously or exogenously generated. Through a study of the Turkish state’s reluctance to apologize for the Armenian genocide, and the Japanese discomfort over the WWII atrocities, I argue that we can avoid tautology in our generalizations by introducing temporal and spatial dimensions to the argument. Inter-subjective pressures matter more at times when traditional routines defining the self are broken and are more likely to create ontological insecurity outside the West. The review of the Turkish and Japanese cases demonstrate that both social and individualistic approaches to ontological security are partly right, but also incomplete because neither takes into account the uneven expansion of international society or the effect this expansion has had on the identity of outsider states who were incorporated into the system at a later date.